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AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CORRUPTION IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
 
Research Question/Issue: Companies operating in transition economies encounter a broad 
range of potential challenges. In the area of tax, firms make direct tax payments but may also 
encounter unofficial tax costs in the form of bribery or extortion. We focus on institutional 
determinants, including formal rules, informal rules, and enforcement, to examine conditions 
under which firms are more likely to encounter these transactions. We operationalize formal 
rules as rule-based trust and informal rules as dispositional trust. 
 
Research Findings/Insights: Based on a sample of over 5,000 firms representing 20 transition 
economies, we show that when rule-based trust is high, the presence of tax enforcement activities 
in the form of visits and inspections by tax officials does not change the relationship between 
rule-based trust and unofficial payments. However, when dispositional trust is low, unofficial 
payments are more likely if verification activities occur. 
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: We adopt a more holistic view and focus on the joint 
consideration of different institutional determinants and firm outcomes. In doing so, the article 
demonstrates the complexity of firms’ tax environments where enforcement mechanisms can 
have unwelcome consequences, and, under certain conditions, create conditions for the 
persistence of corruption. 
 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This paper highlights the importance of the institutional 
landscape, especially considering the history of institutional voids in many transition economies. 
The results have implications for corporate governance and caution regulators and practitioners 
to consider institutional complexities when implementing reforms or establishing businesses in 
transition economies. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corruption, Institutional Theory, Transition 
Economies, Tax Compliance 
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AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CORRUPTION IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc, a transformation of national 
institutions has occurred over the past 25 years. Until the late 1980s, these countries functioned 
as centrally-planned economies where state ownership and control were omnipresent. At the 
same time, many transactions were handled through informal networks where connections 
allowed access to services not broadly available. Since then, some transition economies have 
moved to join the EU while others have not made significant economic progress. National 
institutions have been widely recognized as critical components in explaining why some 
transition economies were able to make a successful transition and others continue to flounder. 
One explanation is that existing structures contribute to path-dependency in business practices 
even amid a push toward internationally-accepted corporate governance practices (e.g., 
Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009).  
 North (1990) classified institutional determinants into three general categories: formal 
rules, informal rules1, and the enforcement characteristics of each. Formal rules, specifically laws 
and regulations, have been extensively examined in the context of corporate governance. Studies 
evaluating institutional determinants tend to focus on a specific feature of institutional 
frameworks but overlook the combined effect of different factors. Informal rules, such as social 
norms and conventions, under certain conditions, become the basis for business exchanges. 
Informal rules have been gaining recognition as an important component in shaping corporate 
governance and regulatory outcomes but remain under-researched (Boytsun, Deloot, & 
Matthyssens, 2011). Therefore, the study of institutional context in transition economies presents 
an opportunity to enrich the corporate governance literature by exploring the combination of 
specific institutional and firm-level factors. 
The current literature examining transition economies tends to highlight the importance 
of formal rules or recognize informally-established structures (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 
2010; Zheng, Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kwok, 2013). The impact of informal rules is less understood 
due to the challenge of identifying, measuring, and interpreting the impact of relevant concepts. 
Enforcement has been typically viewed as a necessary factor to ensure compliance with a 
country’s legal rules (Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, 2003; Pistor, 2000). Thus, prior studies lack 
focus on how formal rules, informal rules, and the manner in which they are enforced work 
together to drive outcomes (North, 2005).  
In the current paper, we investigate this theoretical concept by examining the relationship 
between institutional determinants and unofficial payments incurred by firms in tax transactions. 
Many transition economies continue to struggle with corruption in business transactions where 
firms pay to obtain services and contracts (e.g., bribes, extortion) (Roth & Kostova, 2003). We 
use the term “unofficial payments” to cover both of these actions, as elements of corruption 
(such as bribery and extortion) can be difficult to disengage (Alon & Hageman, 2013). Unofficial 
transactions add to the total tax compliance cost. The enforcement component of tax 
administration is developed with the intention of fostering tax compliance. We define 
verification as “activities typically undertaken by revenue bodies to check whether taxpayers 
have properly reported their tax liabilities,” including audits and inspections (OECD, 2011). The 
influence of enforcement is shaped by the complementarity of the enforcement style with other 
institutional determinants, including formal and informal rules.  
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In order to differentiate between formal and informal rules, we rely on Kramer’s (1999) 
conceptualization of distinct bases of trust at the societal level to distinguish the influence of 
dispositional trust2, considered culturally-based, from rule-based trust, which refers to the 
predictability of institutional action, including regulatory institutions (Muethel & Bond, 2013). 
Trust has been long recognized as an important factor influencing business transactions. In prior 
studies, trust is seen as a necessary component to lower transaction costs and constrain 
opportunistic behavior (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Uslaner (2013) argued that certain types of 
trust can contribute to corruption and the resulting inequality can further undermine trust. We 
recognize different dimensions of trust to examine conditions under which trust can constrain or 
contribute to opportunistic behavior in transition economies.  
We test the proposed relationships based on a comprehensive dataset from the 2009 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS); the data for our sample 
comes from the survey and contains responses from over 5,000 firms in 20 transition economies 
of the former Soviet Bloc. Results show that rule-based trust is associated with a lower 
prevalence of unofficial payments. When rule-based trust is high, the presence of tax 
enforcement activities in the form of visits and inspections by tax officials does not change the 
relationship. Alternatively, higher dispositional trust can contribute to more extensive unofficial 
payments. When dispositional trust is low, verification activities allow both parties a venue to 
evaluate possible transactions and are associated with a higher likelihood of unofficial payments. 
The results also reveal the influence of the ownership structure on unofficial payments where 
higher ownership concentration is associated with a greater prevalence of unofficial payments.  
The study makes a contribution in two areas, theoretical and thematic. Theoretically, we 
contribute to the literature on firms and institutions by focusing on how certain institutions affect 
businesses (e.g., Boytsun et al., 2011; North, 1990), and also contribute to the literature on 
corruption, specifically, unofficial payments in transition economies (e.g., Grosman, 
Okhmatovskiy, & Wright, 2016; Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). Our study extends these themes by 
highlighting that institutions should be examined in concert to gain insight into potential firm 
choices. Moreover, enforcement is not treated as exogenous and taken for granted, but rather as 
an endogenous component which interacts with other institutional determinants. In this particular 
case, it helps to settle the debate about the effectiveness of laws by highlighting the needed 
alignment of institutional determinants, including formal and informal rules and their 
enforcement. Enforcement of formal rules may have unexpected consequences, given self-
enforcement of informal rules.  
Further, our study provides much-needed empirical evidence on tax enforcement efforts 
in the transition economies of the Soviet Bloc (e.g., Torgler, 2008). The extent to which firms 
pay their share of taxes has become increasingly important and highly debated. Prior studies of 
organizational tax behavior have tended to focus on tax compliance issues (e.g., Alon & 
Hageman, 2013; Bayer & Cowell, 2009). Building our arguments based on an institutional 
perspective, we propose that some formal and informal determinants are reflected in the levels of 
trust toward formal institutions and among people and explain tax-related unofficial payments 
encountered by the firms in transition economies.  
The study proceeds as follows. The following section presents a review of the literature 
and develops hypotheses investigating tax-related unofficial payments, and how those are 
influenced by the institutional determinants. The subsequent sections discuss the study’s research 
method and results. The final section provides a summary and a discussion of the theoretical and 
managerial implications. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Tax Compliance and Hidden Costs  
 Tax policy influences a wide range of business decisions, including foreign direct 
investment (Fung, Yau, & Zhang, 2011), import/export activities (Rabino, 1980), and a firm’s 
location (Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, 2012). Furthermore, all financial transactions that 
businesses encounter have tax implications. A wide range of factors, including historical, 
political, and economic developments, influence the functioning of tax systems. The tax system 
of planned economies differs significantly from a market-based model. In centrally-planned 
environments, corporate tax compliance is achieved through a close monitoring of firms by the 
state. Under those conditions, collection efforts and administrative costs associated with the tax 
collection are low. The collapse of the socialist system in the former Soviet bloc triggered the 
introduction of unfamiliar market-oriented reforms of the taxation system (Schaffer & Turley, 
2000).  
Due to the distinctive profile of the political system characterized by high discretion and 
low accountability, corrupt practices became extensive across post-communist countries 
(Karklins, 2002). Tax compliance costs that firms encounter include direct remissions but may 
also have an implicit component when firms have to make additional payments to public 
officials. Typically, two parties are involved in these transactions and one of the participants 
holds a public post (Venard, 2009). Bribery payments (Leff, 1964: 8) have been defined as “a 
practice of buying favors from the bureaucrats responsible for formulating and administering the 
government’s economic policies.” On the other hand, extortion refers to making payments “in 
order to obtain essential services from government where government is the key or sole provider 
of these services” (Sajo, 2003: 189). Unofficial payments can be offered proactively by the firm 
as a bribe (supply-side driven) or extorted by the civil servants (demand-side driven) (Beets, 
2005; Mele´, 2009). Jain (2001) describes the process as bureaucratic corruption where unofficial 
payments are required in order to receive services to which parties are entitled, to speed up a 
bureaucratic procedure, or to obtain a service that is not readily available. In the case of taxation, 
making unofficial payments may assist in lowering the tax bill or avoiding a fine. From an 
economic perspective, unofficial payments become a tax on economic activity (Leff, 1964) and 
divert funds from the treasury (Cleveland, Favo, Frecka, & Owens, 2009). 
Tax-related corruption in transition economies has been identified as a serious problem 
complicating how firms do business (Alon & Hageman, 2013; Joulfaian, 2009). Miller (2006: 
371), based on an extensive survey of transition economies, observed that the use of bribes was 
an institutionalized practice as “many confess to giving or taking them, and still more confess 
that they would give them if necessary, or would take them if the opportunity occurred”. In an 
environment where the government budget lacks transparency, there are no incentives to refrain 
from paying or demanding bribes (Torgler & Schneider, 2009). Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(2000: 287) argue that the lack of effective tax administration and enforcement has been a 
significant problem in the transition from centrally-planned to market-based systems, leading to 
significantly high rates of tax evasion, as “compliance rates of 50 percent or lower are not 
uncommon” in some nations. Overall, understanding the hidden costs of tax compliance, 
including tax-related corruption, remains an important issue in transition economies.  
Institutions and Unofficial Payments 
Institutions shape how firms manage tax transactions. Instead of a single institutional 
component, we are interested in the joint consideration of institutional determinants described by 
North (1990) as formal rules, informal rules and enforcement. Formal rules, specifically laws 
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and regulations, have been extensively examined in the context of corporate governance. 
However, the effectiveness of the legal system depends on the functioning of related enforcement 
mechanisms. Further, as highlighted by Greif and Kingston (2011: 13) “while a ‘rule’ may serve 
as a coordination device, it is fundamentally the expected behavior of others, rather than the rule 
itself, which motivates people’s behavior”. Thus, informal rules, such as social norms and 
conventions, have been gaining recognition as an important element in shaping business 
outcomes, but remain under-researched (Boytsun et al., 2011). We focus on how these 
institutional components reinforce or undermine each other.  
Formal Rules and Unofficial Payments. Institutions set the tone for how businesses 
operate. In transition economies, inherited institutional deficits have shaped the functioning of 
formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse, 2010). The weaknesses in the legal system and inconsistent 
enforcement practices contribute to the prevalence of corruption (Segon & Booth, 2010). The 
inability to implement effective policies and enforce penalties is one of the factors that propagate 
the shadow economy of unofficial payments (Jain, 2001; Torgler & Schneider, 2009). On the 
other hand, a number of cross-national studies found less corruption in counties with higher 
institutional quality (Li, Moy, Lam, & Chu, 2008; Schaffer & Turley, 2000). Sound institutional 
structures provide guidelines of what to expect in a particular situation (Alon, 2013; Greenwood 
et al., 2011) and decrease the dominance of unofficial payments in business transactions 
(Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Cleveland et al., 2009).  
Formal rules are of particular importance, including intentionally-created regulatory and 
legal structures. As summarized by Boytsun, Deloof and Matthyssens (2013), those are 
frequently operationalized as legal families and explain differences in how companies organize 
and obtain financing. However, belonging to a certain legal family does not reflect whether a 
national legal system functions as intended and facilitates transactions. Potentially more 
important is whether the public believes that rules are fairly made and efficiently enforced.  
The ability to depend on a country’s legal infrastructure allows firms to rely on laws and 
government regulation to resolve disputes and enforce contracts (Li, 2009). These institutional 
cues contribute to the formation of the rule-based trust (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 
1998). Kramer (1999) defined rule-based trust as depersonalized and driven by the predictability 
of institutional action. “At the country-level, rule-based trust is mirrored by the confidence a 
country’s citizens have in their country’s law system” (Lin & Wang, 2008; Muethel & Bond, 
1013: 316). Rule-based trust is expected to contribute to the reduction of transaction costs and to 
shape organizational strategic choices (Li et al., 2008; Meyer, 2001). In the case of taxation, rule-
based trust would indicate that tax code is expected to be enforced uniformly and fairly. Thus, 
we anticipate a lower prevalence of tax-related unofficial payments for firms in transition 
economies with higher rule-based trust.  
Hypothesis 1. Rule-based trust is expected to have a negative association with the 
prevalence of unofficial tax-related payments in transition economies. 
 
Enforcement mechanisms influence how and whether formal rules function or achieve 
anticipated outcomes. For example, if traffic rules are regularly enforced through fines and 
courts, there is complementarity that is expected to reinforce the rules. On the other hand, if 
traffic stops end with bribes to the police, the effect of the rules is undermined. In the case of tax 
regulation, enforcement is required in order to improve compliance and convey the consequences 
of non-compliance. In transition economies, the issue of tax enforcement has been complicated 
by the lack of these activities during the previous era of central planning, as taxation was not 
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visible and most taxpayers never encountered a tax official (Tanzi, 2001). As part of tax reform 
efforts, significant verification audits and inspections had to be established to aid tax compliance, 
as taxation that relies purely on self-reporting could not be readily administered in transition 
economies (Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002). Regulatory enforcement is a multidimensional concept 
that includes strategy undertaken by the agency and actions of an inspector (May & Burby, 
1998). Further, different styles of enforcement may have diverse social effects (McAllister, 
2010). Thus, although a governmental agency can craft a worthwhile enforcement strategy, its 
implementation may not reflect it or fails to achieve the intended objectives.  
Effective institutional structure requires complementarity between enforcement and 
regulation. Verification activities may have a complimentary effect in rule-based environments. 
Regulatory and legal institutions can make tax enforcement more effective by curbing the 
discretionary power of tax administrators and incorporating sanctions for parties involved in 
corrupt transactions (Li et al., 2008). If firms perceive that tax inspectors are generally focused 
on fulfilling their responsibilities and tend to rely on the established legal system, their 
participation in the shadow economy would decrease. Thus, in such a setting, verification 
activities are expected to strengthen the negative relationship between rule-based trust and 
unofficial payments that firms incur. 
Hypothesis 2. Verification activities moderate the relationship between rule-based trust 
and unofficial payments such that with the presence of verification activities, the negative 
relationship between rule-based trust and the prevalence of unofficial payments will be 
strengthened.  
 
Informal Rules and Unofficial Payments. In addition to formal rules, informal rules, 
which include norms, conventions, and internally devised codes of conduct, are a critical 
component of institutional environments (North, 1990). These unwritten conventions build 
shared expectations for shareholders, directors, and managers. The informal rules impact the 
effectiveness of other institutional determinants, including formal rules and enforcement. Even 
when laws and regulations are formalized, informal rules can undermine or strengthen their 
impact. For example, nepotism and favoritism may undermine largely functional employment 
rules (Grzymala-Busse, 2010). 
While numerous informal rules exist and are shaped through social interactions, 
dispositional trust is broadly recognized as an important component impacting corporate 
governance and economic outcomes. Dispositional trust has been found to influence agency 
relationships (Child & Rodrigues, 2004), economic growth (Zak & Knack, 2001), and corruption 
(Uslaner, 2002). This culturally-based component of trust is shaped by trust-related experiences 
which mold beliefs about other people (Kramer, 1999). Zak and Knack (2001) proposed that a 
well-functioning rule of law may act as a trust-enhancing mechanism and contribute to higher 
dispositional trust. Bjørnskov (2007) empirically examined determinants of dispositional trust 
but did not find support for the expectation that a country’s legal system can create dispositional 
trust. In contrast to the origins of rule-based trust described above, the origins of dispositional 
trust are based on early trust-related experiences which become the basis of general beliefs about 
people (Rotter, 1971). 
As trust levels vary among members of different cultural groups, researchers have 
examined cross-cultural factors that contribute to those differences. As highlighted by Kramer 
(1999), there are considerable differences in individuals’ predisposition to trust or distrust others. 
The conditions which impact trust levels have also been debated. Muethel and Bond (2013) 
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provide an example of contradictory findings, where some authors found that members of 
collectivist countries tend to have higher levels of trust, while others reached the opposite 
conclusion. For transition economies, trust played an important role during the Soviet era. As a 
result, business transactions were accomplished through reliance on relationships. For example, 
in Russia, individuals relied on trust-based informal networks and exchanged favors to get better 
jobs, acquire financing at privileged terms, and obtain access to high-level decision-makers who 
award business contracts and licenses (Alon & Dwyer, 2012).  
Continuing reliance on informal connections can contribute to the pervasiveness of 
unofficial payments (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007; 2011). Li (2009) and Luo (2005) describe how 
higher levels of dispositional trust can make it easier for unofficial payments to occur. As bribery 
and the extortion of payments are illegal in most countries, firms that are paying and officials 
who are receiving these payments desire to avoid being caught or cheated. The exchange of 
resources between these parties relates to the levels of trust. Where generalized trust is higher, 
officials and the paying firms are more comfortable making unofficial payments, as the chance 
of being turned in is lower (Li, 2009). Thus, higher dispositional trust can provide both parties 
with the comfort that the payment and delivery of promised goods or services would occur (Li, 
2009, Li & Wu, 2010). As it relates to taxation, higher levels of dispositional trust are expected 
to be associated with a greater prevalence of unofficial payments. We propose the following 
hypothesis that reflects the expected relationship between dispositional trust and tax-related 
unofficial payments. 
Hypothesis 3. Dispositional trust is expected to have a positive association with the 
prevalence of unofficial payments in transition economies.  
 
Giving consideration to the enforcement of formal rules is important but insufficient as 
outcomes are driven by the mixture of formal rules, informal rules, and the manner in which they 
are enforced. Although enforcement is expected to improve compliance with formal rules, given 
established informal norms, enforcement may have other consequences. Next, we consider the 
impact of enforcement on the association between informal rules in the form of dispositional 
trust and tax-related unofficial payments. The enforcement of policies depends on the 
discretionary power of tax administrators who may have the authority to enforce regulation in a 
discretionary manner (Jain, 2001). For example, the personal aim of tax agents may diverge from 
institutional purposes of tax collection and contribute to collusion with taxpayers (Franzoni, 
2000). As discussed earlier, in an environment of higher dispositional trust where a 
governmental official and the party making unofficial payments are more likely to trust each 
other, “the temporal and spatial separation of payment and delivery” is not expected to lower the 
likelihood of unofficial exchanges (Li, 2009: 102). On the other hand, where dispositional trust is 
low, verification activities may provide a more secure opportunity to request and make 
payments. Thus, verification inspections may provide a venue to solicit unofficial payments. We 
expect the relationship between dispositional trust and unofficial payments to be strengthened 
when dispositional trust is lower.  
Hypothesis 4. When dispositional trust is lower, unofficial payments are more likely if 
verification activities occur. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data 
 The data for this study was attained from a number of sources; our independent and 
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dependent variables originate from the 2009 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) dataset, the 2005-2008 waves of the World Values Survey, and the 2009 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project. Tax-related firm-level data was obtained from 
the 2009 BEEPS dataset; this survey is a project conducted by the World Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The overall objective of the survey was to obtain 
information on the environment for business development and private enterprise in transition 
economies of the former Soviet Bloc. Earlier administrations of this survey have been used in 
studies of corruption in transition economies (e.g., Alon & Hageman, 2013; Venard, 2009; 
Venard & Hanafi, 2008).  
 The BEEPS 2009 survey was administered in 2008 and 2009. Information on the 
administration of the BEEPS 2009 survey indicates that this survey was conducted using 
stratified random sampling among industry (manufacturing, retail trade, and other service), 
establishment size (fewer than five employees, five to 19 employees, 20 to 99 employees, and 
more than 99 employees), and region. When possible within the stratification criteria, priority 
was given to firms that had participated in the previous BEEPS 2005 survey. The survey itself 
contained over 200 items focusing on the firms’ business environment. As with prior 
administrations, the survey was conducted with face-to-face, locally-trained interviewers; 
furthermore, while smaller firms typically used only one respondent in the interview, larger 
institutions typically needed several respondents in order to address all of the specific topics of 
the interview. Interviewees were frequently assured that their responses would be completely 
anonymous and confidential. To minimize survey non-response, up to four attempts were made 
to contact an establishment to interview for the survey before moving on to a replacement 
establishment that met the same stratification requirements. To ensure the accuracy of responses 
and to reduce the potential sensitive nature of some of the questions, many of the questions asked 
participants to assess the actions of “establishments like this one.” 
The 2009 BEEPS survey was administered to 11,998 business establishments in 30 
transition countries. For the purposes of this study, responses from establishments in ten 
countries (Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Mongolia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, with an aggregate of 3,727 responses) were eliminated 
because data were not available for these countries for some of the study’s variables or they were 
not a transition economy of the former Soviet Bloc. Other business establishments were 
eliminated if they failed to respond to any of the measures used in the study (2,836 responses). 
The final data set for the study included the responses from 5,435 establishments representing 20 
transition countries. Table 1 contains information regarding the number of establishments from 
each of the 20 countries included in the sample.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Because the BEEPS dataset does not include individual measures for dispositional trust 
and rule-based trust, our measures for these constructs arise from aggregated country-wide 
measures found in the World Values Survey and the WGI project, respectively. The World 
Values Survey is a global research survey carried out by the World Values Survey Association at 
regular intervals since 1981; researchers interview a representative sample of individuals in 
nations identified for the survey on a wide range of questions related to the social values. The 
WGI project has been carried out and sponsored by the World Bank since 1996; the project 
reports on aggregate measures of six dimensions of governance in both developing and 
developed nations. These WGI indicators are based on several hundred variables obtained from 
31 different data sources (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 2).3 
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Model  
We employ the following model in examining the effect of governance and verification 
activities on unofficial payments:  
UNOFFICIALPAY = a + bX + dC + e 
where UNOFFICIALPAY is a measure of tax compliance by firms in transition economies; X is a 
set of test variables pertaining to institutional determinants; C is a set of control variables 
representing other factors that could be related to unofficial payments in transition economies; 
and e represents the traditional error term. We describe each of the variables and their measures 
in the subsequent sub-section. 
Due to the fact that our data is measured at two hierarchical levels (i.e., both firm level 
and country level), we follow Alon and Hageman (2013) and Young and Makhija (2014) and use 
a multi-level, mixed-effects, restricted maximum likelihood (REML) regression (also known as 
HLM) in testing our study’s hypotheses to account for the fact that variables are measured at 
both the organization level and the country level. We employ REML linear regression in 
assessing the influences on unofficial payments for tax purposes (the dependent variable); we use 
REML rather than maximum likelihood estimation because REML takes the number of 
parameters into account (i.e., the 20 countries). According to Hox and Keft (1994: 285-286) and 
as cited by Young and Makhija (2014), “Multilevel models assume a hierarchically structured 
population with random sampling of groups and individuals within groups. Consequently, 
multilevel analysis models must incorporate random effects.” Thus, in our model, “Country” is 
included as a random effect to control for the potential differences at the country-level of 
analysis, which helps to control for country-specific differences and addresses the use of the two 
hierarchical levels of data in the analysis.  
Measures 
Dependent Variable. Our study’s dependent variable is the level of unofficial payments 
for tax purposes, UNOFFICIALPAY. This variable is measured as the response to the following 
item from the BEEPS survey: “Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that establishments 
like this one would make in a given year, please tell me how often they make payments/gifts” to 
deal with taxes and tax collection. UNOFFICIALPAY is measured on a 6-point Likert scale (with 
1=never and 6=always).  
Independent Variables. Rule-based trust reflects the confidence a country’s citizens 
have in their law system (Lin & Wang, 2008). Following Muethel and Bond (2013), as a proxy 
for rule-based trust (RULE_TRUST) we use the WGI “rule of law” indicator. This indicator 
measures “the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, and police and courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime or violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 4). It captures perceptions as reported by “survey 
respondents, nongovernmental organizations, commercial business information providers, and 
public sector organizations worldwide” (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 2). According to the World Bank 
researchers, perceptions-based data have particular value in providing insight into perceptions 
and views that drive actions (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Possible scores range from -2.50 to 2.50, 
and higher levels of RULE_TRUST are indicative of higher levels of rule-based trust within a 
country. 
To measure DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST, a country-level measure from the World Values 
Survey was obtained. Based on prior studies examining trust, responses to the question: 
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" were utilized (e.g., Alon & Hageman, 2013; Muethel & Bond, 
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2013). As noted by Li and Wu (2010), this question is widely used to examine respondents’ trust 
in people they meet randomly. Consistent with these studies, we use the World Values Survey 
measures of the proportion of individuals in each country answering “most people can be 
trusted” out of total respondents (as opposed to whether people “need to be very careful”) is our 
measure of DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST. Higher levels of DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST indicate that a 
higher proportion of people believe that most people can be trusted.  
We also measure verification activities so that we can assess whether verification 
activities moderate the relationship between dispositional trust and unofficial payments, and 
between rule-based trust and unofficial payments. This variable, VERIFY, originates from the 
BEEPS 2009 survey, and is the response to the question, “Over the last year, was this 
establishment visited or inspected by tax officials?” VERIFY is therefore coded as an indicator 
variable assessing inspection (“1”) or no inspection (“0”).  
Control Variables. We also include six additional control variables in our analyses. 
Following both Uslaner (2010) and Alon and Hageman (2013), we include controls for the size 
and ownership structure of the business establishments in our sample. First, the variable SIZE 
originates from the BEEPS survey and captures the size of the establishment. It is coded into 
four levels: very small establishments (fewer than five employees, coded as “0”), small 
establishments (five to 19 employees, coded as “1”), medium-sized establishments (20 to 99 
employees, coded as “2”) and large establishments (more than 99 employees, coded as “3”). 
Second, the variable FOREIGN_OWNER also originates from the BEEPS survey and reflects the 
percentage of foreign ownership (i.e., the percentage of ownership held by a foreign shareholder, 
which may be in the form of individuals, companies, or organizations). In their review of the tax 
literature, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that ownership structure often affects the tax 
behavior of corporations.    
Third, we control for a country’s tax burden, as proxied by the measure of a country’s 
total taxes as a percentage of profit, which arises from the Doing Business Indicators from the 
World Bank Group (TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT). This measure provides a control for the formal 
tax rules in place within a country and the degree of tax burden, which could be connected to the 
level of unofficial payments for tax purposes. Fourth, we include a control for ownership 
concentration from the BEEPS survey (OWNER_CONCENTRATION), with a measure of the 
ownership percentage held by the largest owner of the firm. Ownership concentration affects 
how firms utilize their resources. The opaqueness related to concentrated ownership creates 
conditions where firm transactions are less transparent.  
We also include several additional country-level controls which may affect unofficial 
payments. We control for government size, measured as government expenditure as a percent of 
GDP, provided by the World Bank (GOVT_SIZE). Results of the studies examining government 
size and corruption have reached conflicting conclusions. Some have identified a positive 
relationship (Arvate et al., 2010) while a study focused on transition economies found larger 
government to be associated with lower levels of corruption (Goel & Budak, 2006). Finally, 
religion is another factor that can affect levels of corruption through its influence on cultural 
attitudes toward hierarchy and power distance (La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1999). To control for the potential influence of religion, we include a measure of the percentage 
of the population that is affiliated with Christianity (RELIGION). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for all of the dependent, independent, and 
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control variables included in the study’s analysis: the means, standard deviations, minimum 
values, and maximum values for all study variables are presented. This table indicates that 
unofficial payments to deal with taxes and tax collections are relatively infrequent (weighted 
average of 1.70 on a 6-point Likert scale). The average level of dispositional trust in the 
countries of respondent establishments is fairly low, with a mean level of 25% indicating that 
“most people” (i.e., strangers) could be trusted. Finally, the average level of rule-based trust is -
0.16 (out of a possible range from -2.50 to 2.50), showing that on average, levels of rule-based 
trust were somewhat neutral.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As shown in Table 3, unofficial payments to deal with taxes and tax collection were, on 
average, the most frequent in the Kyrgyz Republic (2.65 average), Azerbaijan (2.18 average), 
and Ukraine (2.16 average), and the least frequent in Slovenia (1.07 average). Table 3 also 
contains a summary of the average levels by country for DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST and 
RULE_TRUST. Dispositional trust levels are the highest in Hungary (0.30), Ukraine (0.30) and 
the lowest in the Kyrgyz Republic (0.17) and Slovenia (0.17). Rule-based trust levels are rated as 
the highest among countries in the sample in Slovenia (1.09), and as the lowest in the Kyrgyz 
Republic (-1.32).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Correlation Analysis 
 Table 4 displays a correlation matrix with the correlations among all of the study’s 
dependent, independent, and control variables. The largest absolute values of any correlation 
between the independent or control variables are between TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT and 
RULE_TRUST (correlation coefficient -0.37); the relatively small magnitude of this correlation 
indicate that multicollinearity is unlikely to pose a problem. The dependent variable, 
UNOFFICIALPAY, is positively associated with VERIFY, DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST, and 
TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT, and is negatively associated with SIZE, RULE_TRUST, 
FOREIGN_OWNER, GOVT_SIZE, and RELIGION. DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST is negatively 
associated with RULE_TRUST (correlation coefficient -0.15).4  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Mixed Effect Regression Results  
 We estimate a model to test our hypotheses by regressing the dependent variable 
UNOFFICIALPAY onto the independent variables (RULE_TRUST and 
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST), interaction terms (between VERIFY and RULE_TRUST and between 
VERIFY and DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST), and the control variables; we also control for baseline 
levels of VERIFY. Random effects are included for the country grouping. Table 6 presents the 
results of this regression analysis. The overall model is strongly statistically significant (p < .01).  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 First, Hypothesis 1 posits that higher levels of rule-based trust in a society will be related 
to lower levels of unofficial payments. The coefficient on RULE_TRUST is negative and 
statistically significant at p < .01. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported and it appears that 
establishments located in countries with stronger rule-based trust are less likely to make 
unofficial payments for tax purposes.  
 Hypothesis 2 predicts an interaction between verification activities and rule-based trust in 
terms of their effect on unofficial payments. Specifically, we expect to find that verification 
activities will moderate the relationship between rule-based trust and unofficial payments such 
that with the presence of verification activities, the negative relationship between rule-based trust 
14 
 
and unofficial payments will be strengthened. The coefficient on the interaction term between 
VERIFY and RULE_TRUST is negative and statistically significant (p < .01).  
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that dispositional trust will have a positive relationship with the 
level of unofficial payments. Inspection of the coefficient in Table 4 indicates that this 
relationship was supported, as the coefficient on DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST was positive and 
statistically significant at the p <.05 level. The level of dispositional trust is thus positively 
related to tax-related unofficial payments.  
 The final hypothesis, Hypothesis 4, posits that when dispositional trust is lower, 
unofficial payments are more likely if verification activities occur. Thus, we expect to find an 
interaction effect between VERIFY and DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST in their influence on unofficial 
payments. The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and statistically significant at p 
<.01.  
To further investigate both of the significant interaction effects we observed, we graph 
the joint effect of the variables in the interactions (VERIFY and RULE_TRUST and VERIFY and 
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST) on unofficial payments. First, we graph the joint effect of verification 
activities (present or not in the prior 12-month period) and rule-based trust on unofficial 
payments; we dichotomize rule-based trust into “high” (median or higher) and “low” (below the 
median). While Hypothesis 2 predicted that enforcement would strengthen the negative effect of 
rule-based trust on unofficial payments, the actual relationship observed is more complex. When 
rule-based trust levels are high, unofficial payments are relatively low and there is little 
difference between whether or not verification activities are present. When rule-based trust is 
lower, unofficial payments are higher when verification activities are present than when they are 
absent. This suggests that rule-based trust (i.e., to the extent that individuals have confidence in 
the rules of society and the judicial process) is an important safeguard which lowers the 
likelihood of unofficial payments as a part of the tax verification process. See Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We also further investigate the joint effect of verification activities and dispositional trust 
on unofficial payments. We dichotomize the variable DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST and treat 
responses at or below the median response as “low dispositional trust” and responses above the 
median as “high dispositional trust.” For lower levels of dispositional trust, unofficial payments 
occur more frequently when verification activities are present than when they are absent. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 is supported. That is consistent with the arguments of Li (2009) that in low 
dispositional trust environments, officials take bribes from a narrower circle of people and may 
not feel safe accepting unofficial payments from all parties. In these circumstances, officials may 
be more comfortable obtaining payments as part of the verification visits and inspections where 
both parties interact in person and evaluate possible transactions. See Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 Two of our control variables included in the model in Table 6 are statistically 
significantly related to unofficial payments. First, the coefficient on TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT is 
negative and significant (p <.10), indicating that in our model, unofficial payments are less 
frequent in countries where taxes constitute a higher percentage of total profit. This result is 
consistent with Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000), who also document 
that higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity and that unofficial activity is 
linked not to higher taxes but to a desire to reduce bureaucracy. Second, the coefficient on 
OWNER_CONCENTRATION is positive and significant (p < .10), signifying that unofficial 
payments are more frequent among firms who have a higher concentration of ownership. This 
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finding is consistent with the notion that the opaqueness related to concentrated ownership 
creates conditions where transactions are less transparent and unofficial payments are more 
frequent. We do not find that SIZE, FOREIGN_OWNER, RELIGION, or GOVT_SIZE are related 
to unofficial payments in our model.  
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our study is a part of a growing literature that recognizes that corporate governance is 
socially constructed; thus, its study requires “a broader attention to societal norms, cultural 
attributes, and ethical values” (Aguilera, Florackis, & Kim, 2016: 172). Cross-national 
governance research aims to consider national governance factors when assessing firm-level 
practices. Country-level informal and formal rules provide guidelines “for individuals and 
organizations to deal with uncertainty, decode the environment, and take appropriate actions” 
(Schiehll & Martins, 2016: 182). Enforcement of institutionalized practices is an important but 
understudied component. Based on the institutional perspective, we theorize how enforcement of 
formal rules interacts with embedded informal practices and influences organizational processes. 
Previously, enforcement has been examined in the context of legal rule compliance, but 
recognition of informal rules allows us to gain insight into additional dimensions of enforcement.  
Overall, our results provide strong support for the hypothesized relationships. Controlling 
for firm and country characteristics, we find that unofficial payments are lower in environments 
with higher rule-based trust, regardless of whether verification activities occur. Dispositional 
trust has a positive relationship with unofficial payments. Verification activities have a much 
stronger influence on unofficial payments when dispositional trust is low as opposed to high 
dispositional trust environments. As anticipated, under those conditions, officials may be more 
comfortable obtaining payments as part of the verification activities where both parties interact 
and evaluate possible transactions. The findings help to settle the debate about the effectiveness 
of laws by highlighting the needed alignment of institutional determinants, including formal and 
informal rules and their enforcement. Enforcement of formal rules may have unexpected 
consequences, given the self-enforcement of informal rules.  
Our work highlights several avenues for future research. Continuing focus on multi-level 
relationships will provide a more in-depth understanding of the interactions between the firm-
level variables and national institutions. Particularly of interest are factors contributing to the 
persistence of the informal structures and to path dependency, even amid attempts to dismantle 
them. Kumar and Zattoni (2016) highlight the importance of recognizing additional aspects of 
national institutional environment that influence firms’ behavior. In addition to the national legal 
frameworks, other regulated practices, including tax and accounting regulation, can deter or 
encourage opportunistic behavior and influence corporate governance practices. 
With greater diffusion of corporate governance codes across different parts of the world, 
overstatement of compliance and factors that contribute to it are important to study. As 
highlighted by our study and Sobhan (2016), examining compliance can be insufficient, as 
resistance to change and embeddedness of informal institutionalized practices impact the 
implementation of corporate governance codes and organizational change. Future studies of the 
differences between the reported compliance and actual practices will need to identify factors 
that contribute to gaps in compliance or to misapplication of corporate governance codes. 
The state plays a crucial role in shaping organizational strategy. Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, 
and Wright (2016) reviewed literature on state control and how this control influences and 
shapes firms’ corporate governance. Besides direct control, the state is also responsible for 
creating and enforcing policies and regulations. There is a need for more fine-grained insight into 
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enforcement and why certain enforcement approaches, including reporting, verification 
activities, audits, and fines, do not function as intended and the unintended firm-level 
consequences that arise.  
 Our study’s results should be interpreted in light of its limitations. We use both firm-level 
(2009 BEEPS survey data) and country-level (World Values Survey, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators) data. The typical limitations when using survey data also apply (e.g., non-response 
bias, social desirability bias, single-item measurement), but the BEEPS survey is a rigorous, 
well-established survey that has gone through multiple iterations of development and has also 
been relied upon by prior researchers (e.g., Alon & Hageman, 2013; Venard 2009). Another 
potential limitation is that while our analysis examines the frequency of unofficial payments, it 
does not assess the amount of unofficial payments actually made. Future research could assess 
the amount of unofficial payments made in transition economies and provide more nuanced 
insight into the economic significance of these transactions.    
Firms operating or entering transition economies need a deep awareness of institutional 
peculiarities and their impact on various business transactions. In the past twenty-five years, 
transition economies have undergone extensive institutional transformation. It is necessary to 
recognize the unique attributes of transition economies as expectations based on practices of 
developed countries are not necessarily transferable to a setting with distinct institutional 
characteristics. Firms should also be mindful of the complexity inherent within tax environments. 
This study highlights unintended consequences that can occur in conjunction with policies aimed 
at improving tax compliance. Policymakers should thus be careful to heed the features of the 
institutional environment when developing administrative policies and procedures. 
1As previously noted by Boytsun, Deloof, and Matthyssens (2011), North (1990) used “rules” and “constraints” 
interchangeably. Following their approach, we use the term “rules” to avoid confusion. 
2 This type of trust has also been referred to as generalized trust (Dincer & Uslaner, 2010; Li, 2009).  
3 Our study uses multiple data sources, which has the potential to compound error (Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985). 
However, using multiple data sources enables analysis with a richer data set and allows for the examination of more 
complex issues than may be investigated when using a single data set.   
4 Bjørnskov, C. (2012) found that social trust (similar to DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST) and the rule of law 
(RULE_TRUST) had a positive relationship. However, Bjørnskov (2012) examines a wider array of countries; our 
study has a narrower focus on transition economies.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Characteristics by Country 
 
Country Number of Business 
Establishments in 
Final Sample 
Albania 125 
Armenia 308 
Azerbaijan 228 
Belarus 180 
Bosnia/ Herzegovina 250 
Bulgaria 196 
Croatia 126 
Czech Republic 210 
Georgia 215 
Hungary 229 
Kyrgyz Republic 195 
Latvia 192 
Lithuania 233 
Moldova 222 
Poland 340 
Romania 293 
Russia 871 
Slovak Republic 217 
Slovenia 263 
Ukraine 542 
Total 5,435 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
UNOFFICIALPAY 1.72 1.15 1.00 6.00 
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST 0.26 0.04 0.17 0.30 
RULE_TRUST -0.16 0.71 -1.32 1.09 
VERIFY 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 1.82 0.84 0.00 3.00 
FOREIGN_OWNER 7.98 25.21 0.00 100.00 
TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT 49.50 19.17 32.50 144.40 
OWNER_CONCENTRATION 78.80 26.72 1.00 100.00 
GOVT_SIZE 17.55 3.59 8.50 25.88 
RELIGION 72.60 26.84 3.00 99.50 
Variable Definitions: 
UNOFFICIALPAY arises from the 2009 BEEPS survey and assesses the frequency of unofficial 
gifts or payments that are made to deal with taxes and tax collection (on a 6-point Likert-
type scale); higher numbers indicate higher frequency of unofficial payments.  
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST arises from the 2005-2008 waves of the World Values Survey and is a 
country-level measure indicating the percentage of people who believe that most people 
can be trusted.   
RULE_TRUST arises from the 2009 WGI project and is a measure for a country’s regulatory 
quality; possible values range from -2.50 to 2.50.     
VERIFY arises from the 2009 BEEPS survey and assesses whether establishments have been 
visited or inspected by tax officials in the last year (“yes” is coded as “1” and “no” is 
coded as “0”).  
SIZE arises from the 2009 BEEPS survey and assesses whether the firms are very small (coded 
as “0,” with fewer than 5 employees) small (coded as “1,” with between five and 19 
employees), medium-sized (coded as “2,” with 20-99 employees), or large (coded as “3,” 
with more than 99 employees).  
FOREIGN_OWNER arises from the 2009 BEEPS survey and is the percentage of ownership by 
private (non-public or governmental), foreign (non-domestic) individuals or 
organizations.  
TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT arises from Doing Business Indicators’ (World Bank Group) measure 
of total taxes as a percentage of profit.  
OWNER_CONCENTRATION arises from the 2009 BEEPS survey and represents the ownership 
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percentage of the largest owner.  
GOVT_SIZE arises from the World Bank’s 2008 measure of general government final 
consumption expenditures as a percentage of GDP.  
RELIGION arises from 2010 Global Religious Landscape (Pew Forum on Religion & Public 
Life) measures of the percentage of the population that ascribes to Christianity.  
Descriptive statistics are based on 5,435 observations.  
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics by Country 
 
Country Average Level of 
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST 
Average Level of 
RULE_TRUST 
Average Frequency of 
UNOFFICIALPAY 
Albania 0.26 -0.53 2.02 
Armenia 0.25 -0.46 2.04 
Azerbaijan 0.21 -0.86 2.16 
Belarus 0.25 -1.01 1.42 
Bosnia/ 
Herzegovina 
0.22 -0.35 1.50 
Bulgaria 0.25 -0.05 1.56 
Croatia 0.25 0.15 1.21 
Czech 
Republic 
0.29 0.96 1.28 
Georgia 0.18 -0.22 1.56 
Hungary 0.30 0.78 1.86 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
0.17 -1.32 2.65 
Latvia 0.25 0.81 1.44 
Lithuania 0.22 0.71 1.25 
Moldova 0.18 -0.47 1.67 
Poland 0.23 0.62 1.28 
Romania 0.20 0.05 1.81 
Russia 0.29 -0.79 1.99 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.26 0.55 1.22 
Slovenia 0.17 1.09 1.07 
Ukraine 0.30 -0.80 2.18 
Weighted 
Average  
0.25 -0.16 1.72 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.   
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TABLE 4 
Correlation Table 
 
Variable 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  
1. UNOFFICIALPAY 1.00          
2. DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST 0.09*** 1.00         
3. RULE_TRUST -0.28*** -0.15*** 1.00        
4. VERIFY 0.07*** -0.02 -0.16*** 1.00       
5. SIZE -0.03** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.16*** 1.00      
6. FOREIGN_OWNER -0.02* -0.01 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.19*** 1.00     
7. TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT 0.03** 0.17*** -0.37*** 0.00 0.04*** -0.01 1.00    
8. OWNER_CONCENTRATION 0.01 -0.06*** 0.04*** -0.01 -0.19*** 0.06*** -0.04*** 1.00   
9. GOVT_SIZE -0.14*** -0.05*** 0.36*** -0.18*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.09*** 1.00  
10. RELIGION -0.10*** 0.07*** 0.22*** -0.15*** 0.01 -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 0.31*** 1.00 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01  
Correlation table is based on 5,435 observations. All presented p-values are two-tailed. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 5 
Mixed Effect Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Unofficial Payments   
  
Variable  Parameter 
Estimates 
Test Variables  
  
RULE_TRUST(H1) -0.34 (0.10)*** 
VERIFY x RULE_TRUST(H2) -0.20 (0.05)*** 
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST (H3) 2.78 (1.51)** 
VERIFY x 
DISPOSITIONAL_TRUST (H4) 
-1.72 (0.73)*** 
  
Control and Other Variables  
VERIFY  0.44 (0.18)** 
SIZE -0.02 (0.02) 
FOREIGN_OWNER -0.00 (0.00) 
TAX_PERCENT_PROFIT -0.01 (0.00)* 
OWNER_CONCENTRATION 0.00 (0.00)* 
GOVT_SIZE 
RELIGION 
0.00 (0.02) 
-0.00 (.002) 
Constant 1.29 (0.50)*** 
  
Model  
Country (Group) Random Effects Included 
Wald χ2 61.40 
Prob > χ2  <.0001 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses denote the standard errors of the estimates; mixed-effect regression 
results use restricted maximum likelihood (REML). The mixed-effect regression model is based 
on 5,435 observations. Test variables are one-tailed p-values; remaining variables are two-tailed 
p-values. 
 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01  
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
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FIGURE 1 
Interaction of Verification Activities and Rule-Based Trust 
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FIGURE 2 
Interaction of Verification Activities and Dispositional Trust 
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